A New Chapter? Kosovo and Serbia

by Dren Kika & Vuk Tripković

It’s been 27 years since the end of the war in Kosovo, 18 years since the declaration of independence, and 15 years since the beginning of the Pristina–Belgrade Dialogue. Several governments have negotiated multiple agreements ranging from mundane technical issues to the elephant in the room: the Association of Serb-majority Municipalities (ASM) in Kosovo. However, despite the enormous resources, commitment, time, and energy spent by the EU and the U.S. as genuine facilitators in this long process, little to no progress has been made. It’s time to finally turn the page on this hard slog.

The Balkan region is notorious for its conflicts throughout the centuries. While the Kosovo–Serbia dispute certainly feels very recent given the few decades it has been since Yugoslavia’s breakup, it traces its origins centuries earlier under very different circumstances. Notwithstanding this long history of conflict, Kosovo and Serbia do not necessarily have to remain shackled by a difficult past. There is a mountain to climb, granted, but not an impossible feat. Many war wounds haven’t healed yet, including the unknown whereabouts of more than 1,600 missing people from Kosovo, and the memories remain fresh. Understandably, public opinion on both sides is rife with hesitation, prejudice, and distrust. The future, however, does not have to be emblazoned with a sense of perpetual anguish.

Nations, much like families, tend to pass unresolved burdens to the next generation. In Serbia, the decades following the conflicts of the 1990s illustrate this pattern with particular clarity. The war in Croatia, concluded with arrangements that left little room for renewed large-scale ethnic conflict. Then came the war in Bosnia, which left one of the darkest marks on Serbia’s history and whose shadow still lingers to this day. Finally, the Kosovo war and its consequences have become a millstone around our generation’s neck, the largest political question left unsettled and one that continues to define the country’s future.

Frozen conflicts rarely persist by historical inertia alone. More often, they endure because contemporary political incentives favor their maintenance; in the case of Serbia (and Balkans in general) it helps governments remain in power. One of the biggest tools they use to keep the conflict alive is the media, which the Serbian regime almost absolutely controls and utilizes to sustain a climate of hostility by attacking Albanians, Croatians and the opposition interchangeably.

One can rightly succumb to the irresistible urge to delve into the details of where it all went wrong over more than a decade of negotiations on Kosovo’s status and its relationship with Serbia. This would take a lifetime of observations, analyses, ifs, buts, maybes, and whataboutery. Our endeavor is much simpler and more straightforward: how to break the deadlock despite the significant hurdles. It is both unsustainable and dangerous to allow this intricate situation to keep hindering the potential for regional cooperation and mutual growth.

Kosovo’s statehood remains disputed by around half of the world. Serbia claims that NATO’s intervention in 1999 was a blatant violation of international law, while Albanians in Kosovo believe that independence from Yugoslavia (later Serbia) was the only plausible remedy to the vile apartheid-like state of the 90s. To this day, Serbia does not formally recognize the Republic of Kosovo, even though it engages in never-ending negotiations with its government. Belgrade has serious concerns about the Serbian minority in Kosovo, which comprises about 5% of the overall population. Serbia’s efforts are heavily concentrated in the four northernmost municipalities. Under the 2015 Brussels Agreement, the ten Serb-majority municipalities may establish a joint Association with far-reaching autonomy in several fields. However, several provisions of the agreement were turned down by Kosovo’s Constitutional Court, and the ASM never took off.

The 2023 Brussels and Ohrid Agreement opened a new chapter in the relations between the two countries, with the ‘de facto’ recognition of Kosovo by Serbia on the table. However, neither side has implemented its provisions, and northern Kosovo has since witnessed multiple flare-ups, culminating in the September 2023 Banjska attack, an armed assault carried out by Serb militants against the Kosovo Police. It took two full years for local Serbs to return to municipal institutions after boycotting the snap elections in the north, while tensions remain palpable. The dialogue has been largely dormant in recent years, with occasional meetings leaving much to be desired. The underlying issue, however, persists: a lack of willingness on either side to move forward.

External observers often propose facile solutions to this intricate dispute. From within, the challenges are far more evident. Kosovo’s current government is widely perceived as harsh in its enforcement of the rule of law in the north, drawing repeated criticism from the international community. Serbia, on the other hand, remains entirely uncompromising when it comes to accepting the reality of Kosovo. Formal recognition by Serbia has long been the ultimate goal of successive Kosovar governments, yet it appears far-fetched to expect Belgrade to take such a step. Nevertheless, even a slight shift in Serbia’s stance, such as abstaining from blocking Kosovo’s membership in international organizations, could seal the deal.

We believe both countries should strive toward full EU membership, and neither should be allowed to join before the other. NATO membership remains Kosovo’s ultimate security objective, while Serbia already participates in the Partnership for Peace. At the same time, Kosovo must ensure that the guaranteed rights of the Serbian minority, as enshrined in its constitution, are fully upheld. Maintaining free trade between the two countries is crucial, and additional initiatives to foster mutual understanding should be encouraged. This frozen conflict, which continues to hinder regional development, must not remain a burden for future generations.

The Overton window moves when social realities change. They are shaped by lived experience, economic opportunity, and social interaction. That is where individuals, civil society, universities, and independent economic actors step in. In practical terms, this means prioritizing economic cooperation over nationalism. Expanding trade and cross-border partnerships would create stakeholders invested in stability rather than confrontation. The same logic applies to universities and cultural institutions. Academic exchanges, informal education initiatives and civic engagement exposes younger generations to real people, not just propaganda painted pictures. 

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This piece reflects the author’s views, not necessarily the entire magazine. We welcome a range of pro-liberty perspectives. Send us your pitch or draft.

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