The Kosovo–Serbia Stalemate Is Costing Both Sides Their Freedom

by Zhyldyz Sultangazieva

More than fifteen years after declaring independence, Kosovo remains caught in a dialogue that promises normalization but repeatedly produces deadlock. This situation is often explained as unavoidable — the result of history, identity, or deep-rooted political disagreements. But the current stalemate is not inevitable. It is the product of political choices. And its real cost is not diplomatic delay, but freedom.

Kosovo’s struggle to fully function as an independent state begins with recognition. While the country is recognized by most Western states, several European Union members still refuse to recognize its independence, limiting Kosovo’s ability to participate fully in international institutions and act autonomously on the global stage, as acknowledged by the European Commission.

Beyond Europe, the problem is even more pronounced. More than 40 percent of United Nations member states continue to withhold recognition of Kosovo’s independence, restricting its access to international organizations and reinforcing its political vulnerability

This incomplete recognition has real consequences. Kosovo exists as a sovereign state in legal terms, but its freedom to act independently is constantly constrained. Independence, under these conditions, remains partial.

This situation did not emerge by chance. Serbia has invested significant diplomatic energy in challenging Kosovo’s legitimacy, lobbying other states not to recognize Kosovo and encouraging some to withdraw recognition altogether. This campaign has been well documented by the International Crisis Group.


By framing Kosovo’s independence as a violation of territorial integrity, Serbia has succeeded in keeping Kosovo’s status contested long after 2008. The result is a prolonged state of uncertainty in which Kosovo’s sovereignty exists on paper, but its freedom to operate internationally remains limited in practice.

At the same time, Kosovo faces a different kind of pressure through the EU-facilitated dialogue with Serbia. The 2013 Brussels Agreement was presented as a breakthrough — a way to normalize relations without requiring Serbia to formally recognize Kosovo. Yet embedded in this agreement are ambiguities that have since become sources of deep tension, particularly around the creation of the Association of Serb-Majority Municipalities (ASM).


For many Kosovar Albanians, the ASM represents a serious concern. There is widespread fear that it could evolve into a parallel political structure inside Kosovo, weakening state authority and threatening sovereignty. These fears are not abstract. They are shaped by regional experiences where similar arrangements have undermined political stability. The lack of clarity about the ASM’s powers — especially in areas such as education, healthcare, and economic coordination — has only intensified this anxiety.

As a result, Kosovo has repeatedly delayed implementation, arguing that any form of minority self-governance must remain strictly within the constitutional framework of the state. From Kosovo’s perspective, protecting sovereignty is not an act of obstruction, but a defensive response to a genuine risk.

However, the consequences of deadlock extend beyond state institutions. In northern Kosovo, Serb communities continue to live in a political grey zone. Without clear governance arrangements, everyday life is shaped by uncertainty. Political rights, security, and access to services depend less on stable institutions and more on informal power structures and external influence. For many Serbs in the north, this lack of clarity limits their freedom just as much as unresolved status limits Kosovo’s.

In this sense, the stalemate restricts freedom on both sides. Kosovo’s freedom to govern its territory coherently is constrained, while the freedom of Serb communities to live with predictability, security, and political agency remains fragile. The longer the impasse continues, the more both communities remain hostage to unresolved political disputes.

The European Union has played a central role in sustaining dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia. But while dialogue has continued, implementation has not. Agreements are signed, praised, and then quietly ignored. Deadlines pass without consequences. Analysts from the European Council on Foreign Relations and Balkan Insight have repeatedly warned that the lack of enforcement has turned dialogue into a process without accountability. When delay carries no cost, obstruction becomes a rational political strategy.

When Dialogue Stops Delivering Freedom

At the core of today’s deadlock lies a sequencing dispute. Kosovo insists that progress toward recognition and an end to Serbian interference must come before the establishment of the ASM. Serbia argues the opposite — that the ASM must come first before any further normalization. Both sides expect the other to move first, and as a result, nothing moves at all.

If normalization is to mean anything, it must move away from symbolic victories and focus on freedom in practice. This requires abandoning the logic of “who goes first” and allowing parallel steps. Kosovo can engage with minority governance mechanisms that are constitutionally limited and internationally supervised without giving up sovereignty. Serbia can commit to non-interference in Kosovo’s international participation without formally recognizing independence. Neither step requires political surrender, but both would expand freedom on the ground.

It is also necessary to be realistic. Full reconciliation or mutual recognition may not be achievable in the near future. But peaceful coexistence, stable institutions, and freedom from recurring crises are achievable goals. Lowering the symbolic stakes of each step allows space for gradual trust-building and reduces the risk of escalation.

The current deadlock is not frozen by history. It is maintained by political choice. Continuing on this path limits freedom for both communities and keeps the region unstable. Reframing the dialogue around freedom — freedom for Serb communities to live securely and govern themselves meaningfully, and freedom for Kosovo to function as an independent state without obstruction — is not idealism. It is the most realistic way forward.

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