Abdelghani Bensi on the immigration debate that Europe keeps misunderstanding.
Europe keeps asking the wrong question about migration. It keeps asking about who we should let in. Those of us in libertarian circles, however, might be familiar with a different kind of debate: that of how consent works in a world controlled by public property and welfare states.
Where libertarians tend to disagree on immigration does not typically boil down to “pro-migrant” vs. “anti-migrant” positions. Instead, they differ when it comes to determining which of the various institutional failings generates the least amount of coercion.
Two common libertarian starting points:
- The first camp’s arguments stem from the belief that people should be able to move freely. Under this viewpoint, movement is a fundamental liberty. States with exclusive control over their borders are simply adding further illegitimate ways to impose government coercive power.
- The second camp emerges from property rights. An example of this position can be seen in the thought of Hans Hermann Hoppe, who recognizes that under a system of full private ownership, individuals would not have the inherent right to enter properties without invitation. However, for Hoppe, the present issue is that governments currently own the majority of the common areas (streets, schools, and government-operated welfare). Thus, when governments admit immigrants to these “socialized” common areas, they force them on taxpayers, leading to forced integration.
These aren’t exhaustive camps so much as two recurring emphases: many libertarians defend openness on property-rights grounds while rejecting both state border coercion and any claim that ‘public commons’ justify forced association. However, the above are common positions, both of which, it seems, are attempting to apply the same principle of ‘non-aggression’ to a non-ideal world.
What does Hoppe exactly argue?
Rather than appealing to cultural panic or nationalist instincts, Hoppe’s critique is institutional. He argues that public property cannot meaningfully rely on consent when access to state-run spaces is dictated by political decisions rather than by the choices of actual owners (the net taxpayers). In such a system, welfare quietly changes the nature of movement itself. When entry comes with automatic access to benefits, migration stops being a voluntary exchange and starts resembling a fiscal claim on others. From this perspective, Hoppe’s preference for invitation or sponsorship is not about exclusion for its own sake, but about approximating how private property would function in a fully voluntary society. Open borders, he suggests, may sound libertarian in theory, yet look quite different once filtered through a welfare state.
His point is ultimately descriptive, not moralistic: mass migration under expansive welfare regimes is simply not the same phenomenon as migration in a world governed by voluntary contract. Hoppe is a polarising figure and criticisms of him often go beyond this institutional argument; this piece brackets those disputes to focus on the consent/coercion logic at stake.
The free-movement rebuttal
Critics often acknowledge the real problems created by the welfare state, yet hesitate when it comes to accepting the implications of those problems. Start with border enforcement. The powers required to police borders rarely stay confined to migration policy. Surveillance, profiling, detention, and broad discretionary control over movement tend to spill outward, reshaping the relationship between the state and everyone under its authority.
There is also the moral cost of restricting mobility. Limiting people’s ability to move traps them within regimes that may be actively harming them. One of the most effective tools individuals and communities have to hold governments accountable is the ability to leave. When exit is blocked, it is not the community that is protected, but the tyrant, who can rule with fewer consequences.
Finally, migrant integration is less a question of individual behaviour than of social context. Integration emerges through everyday socialization, incentives, and mutual adaptation—not through coercive policies imposed from above. Adding heavy-handed state control does little to foster cohesion and often undermines it instead.
Where does Europe keep going wrong?
European discussions on migration are usually centered around two moral extremes: compassion or control. In contrast, libertarians see migration primarily as an institutional-related trade-off problem rather than a moral posture. The relevant questions are not abstract expressions of virtue, but concrete ones such as who should be required to pay, who should be required to interact, and which policies will ultimately lessen the amount of coercion, given the real level of incentives.
It is this disconnect that leads to repeated failures of European Asylum Systems (EAS). After making lofty (and often unrealistic) promises, the actual implementation of EAS usually results in a mix of deterrence, camps, and legal grey areas. This mix is the reason that EASs’ humanitarian protections, labour migration systems, and welfare access are prone to generate tension.
The real question in the immigration debate is not about the desirability of migration but about the reduction of coercion.
A workable libertarian synthesis
A model exists for promoting freedom through mobility for citizens who wish to enter another country while respecting property rights and not pretending that the welfare state does not exist.
First, free mobility should not mean automatic membership. People should be able to move easily for work, study, or family reasons without that movement instantly granting full access to the welfare state. Decoupling entry from benefits preserves freedom while avoiding forced redistribution, and it creates a non-coercive incentive for political and civic engagement rather than entitlement by default.
Second, migration should operate through invitation as much as possible. Allowing private individuals, employers, churches, associations, and charities to sponsor newcomers grounds migration in consent rather than bureaucracy. Sponsorship aligns responsibility with choice and allows migration to function more like it would in a private-property system, even within a mixed public-private reality.
Third, integration problems should be addressed at their institutional source. The more social life is organised around public property and centralised welfare, the more migration turns into a political fight over shared resources. Decentralisation, privatisation, and local control reduce this zero-sum dynamic, and with it, the perceived need for coercive integration policies and ever-expanding border enforcement.
Finally, asylum must be clearly separated from general migration. Protection should be fast, humane, and narrowly focused on safety, not used as a backdoor for labour policy or welfare access. Clear work-visa channels and private sponsorship reduce pressure on asylum systems, limit abuse, and ensure that those genuinely fleeing persecutions receive protection without distorting the entire migration framework.
The bottom line
The real question in the immigration debate is not about the desirability of migration but rather about the reduction of coercion, and how this applies to taxpayer-funded public property. The best answer to institutional problems is neither a closed border scenario nor an open welfare scheme but a strategy based on increased freedom of movement along with consented sponsorship or guaranteed sponsorship.
