Updated November 11th 2026 by the author
The 2026 Midterm Elections in the United States have delivered a resounding victory for the Democrats, marked by a substantial electoral swing and a shift in control of Congress. With the prospect of a Democratic administration returning to Washington in 2029 becoming increasingly plausible, the question of what transatlantic relations will look like in the coming years is becoming ever more pressing.
For many in Europe, however, the answer is becoming increasingly clear: regardless of whether the United States will be a reliable partner, Europe can no longer afford to depend on it for its security, trade, or technological leadership. For the first time in nearly a century, Europe must stop following and start acting, ensuring its own survival, autonomy, and global influence.
This is the foundation of what I will refer to as Realignmentism: a doctrine that redefines European power not as a byproduct of American goodwill, but as the outcome of trade diversification, institutional reform, and assertiveness on the global stage.
The direction is relatively clear. What remains uncertain is how Europe should pursue it. Virtually every political bloc, party, and country offers a different vision of what Europe should or should not become. Yet, in my view, Realignmentism presents a fascinating opportunity. To secure its long-term survival and competitiveness, Europe will likely have to embrace a sort of libertarian realignmentism, centred on global free trade, individual rights, and a competitive business environment.
A Stronger and Freer Europe
With both the United States and China advancing rapidly in innovation, artificial intelligence, energy, and strategic technologies, Europe’s need for reform is no longer merely ideological; it is increasingly existential. Fragmented markets, regulatory complexity, and inconsistent national frameworks have left Europe structurally disadvantaged.
The proposed EU-INC, for instance, offers a practical response to one of Europe’s deepest structural weaknesses: market fragmentation. By allowing businesses to incorporate under a single European legal framework, with registration possible within 48 hours and the freedom to operate seamlessly across the Single Market, it could significantly reduce the barriers facing European entrepreneurs. Rather than navigating 27 different legal, tax, and administrative systems, businesses would have the opportunity to operate under a common European framework from day one.
Meanwhile, on the international stage, Trumpism has not only weakened America’s credibility as a reliable partner, but has actively reshaped US foreign policy into an increasingly transactional and unilateral project. Even beyond 2028, the political appetite for sustained American international engagement remains uncertain.
Europe therefore faces a choice: retreat into regulatory isolation or assert itself through openness. If it wishes to become an assertive and competitive global actor under the realignment doctrine, it must recognise that trade policy is foreign policy. Expanding trade relationships with Latin America, India, Africa, and Southeast Asia is not about undercutting traditional allies, but about ensuring that Europe remains central to the global economy rather than peripheral to a world increasingly divided into rival blocs.
Yet external independence cannot exist without internal competitiveness. Europe cannot credibly pursue strategic autonomy while struggling to generate the growth, innovation, and technological capacity necessary to sustain it. Free trade, deeper market integration, and initiatives such as EU-INC offer a practical, market-driven approach to addressing these weaknesses. Strategic autonomy must be built through economic strength and openness, not protectionism.
Beyond economic competitiveness, a libertarian approach to realignment places individual rights at the centre of European power. Privacy is not a secondary concern to be traded away for security; it is a foundational pillar of freedom, innovation, and trust. Strong encryption and the protection of private communications enable secure commerce, protect journalists and dissidents, and foster technological development. Undermining them weakens Europe’s digital ecosystem and risks aligning its policies, unintentionally, with the surveillance practices of illiberal states.
Europe has long exercised influence as a standards setter, from data protection under GDPR to competition policy. But standards only matter when they are principled and consistent. ChatControl risks transforming Europe from a model of rights-based regulation into an exporter of surveillance norms, providing authoritarian governments with political cover to justify their own excesses.
The choice facing Europe is therefore not between liberty and security, or markets and sovereignty. It is between stagnation and adaptation. By embracing a libertarian path to realignment, grounded in openness, institutional restraint, and strategic confidence, Europe can emerge not merely as a participant in the new global order, but as its liberal anchor.
Europe’s most radical move may also be its most familiar one: to lead by example, and make liberalism competitive again.
Our path is clear. Yet, in pursuing it, a deeper issue arises.
Europe’s Bottleneck
Europe has proven that it can reach the finish line. Crossing it, on the other hand, can take decades.
The EU-Mercosur agreement, for instance, took approximately 25 years to negotiate. Even after reaching an agreement, the process faces further legal and institutional hurdles. This is not an isolated case, but a symptom of a much broader problem: European decision-making is often slow, fragmented, and constrained by competing national interests.
The institutional architecture of the European Union makes collective action particularly difficult in several areas. The Commission, Council, and Parliament operate through a complex distribution of responsibilities, while unanimity requirements in areas such as foreign policy and taxation give individual Member States the ability to block collective decisions. Even where a common European interest is evident, national political considerations can repeatedly obstruct progress.
The result is a Europe that struggles to translate its economic and political potential into action. Trade agreements take decades, foreign policy remains fragmented, and businesses continue to face barriers that undermine the very Single Market Europe has spent decades building.
Europe is slow. Europe is distant. Europe risks becoming increasingly irrelevant. And this stands in contradiction to what Europe represents: a continent historically associated with innovation, intellectual advancement, and excellence. Western tradition itself is rooted in an aspiration towards progress and human advancement. A Europe that increasingly becomes the opposite of these ideals will lose not only its competitiveness, but also its sense of purpose.
The problem, therefore, is not simply that Europe needs better policies. It needs institutions capable of delivering them. How can Europe become faster? How can foreign policy, trade, and the business environment become more coherent? How can innovation and advancement prevail? How can Europe become freer and more prosperous?
For me, the answer is clear. For many, it remains a rather frightening thought.
Europe must be one.
But that is a topic for next time.
Good reporting is cheaper than heavy-handed regulation. Support freedom and independent journalism by donating today.
This piece reflects the author’s views, not necessarily the entire magazine. We welcome a range of pro-liberty perspectives. Send us your pitch or draft.
